INTRODUCTION
In 2016 agents from United States Homeland Security Investigations stopped by Craig Gilmore's house in Los Angeles to determine whether he owned a painting by the seventeenthcentury artist Melchior Geldorp. 1 The picture they were seeking, Portrait of a Lady, had been owned by the National Museum in Warsaw, but had disappeared when the Nazis demolished the city after the Uprising of 1944 toward the end of WWII.
Holocaust-era art claims as public entities or private citizens implicates ethical issues that should bear on the disposition of these cases, and if so, to what extent.
Part I considers the origins of these claims during WWII, and the temporal legal obstacles they may encounter many years after the events that engendered them. Part II discusses the recently enacted Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 ("HEAR"), which established a national six-year statutory limitation period applicable exclusively to claims for artworks lost as a result of Nazi expropriation.
Part II examines specific disputes that are identified in HEAR's text as demonstrating the need for this legislation, and also claims purportedly enabled by its subsequent enactment. While these disputes have involved temporal defenses, the courts adjudicating them have also exhaustively reviewed the factual bases of the claims and, in every case, found them deficient. In other words, these claims would fail on their merits alone, regardless of the fact that they also involved obstacles based upon "legal technicalities." 14 This raises the question whether HEAR's prohibition of temporal defenses may be used, at least in part, as a pretext by which to reopen, or affect the disposition of, disputes already adjudicated or currently being litigated.
Most of these claims have targeted works in public collections. Part III considers the public's role in generating value, and thereby an element of public ownership, in artworks in museums. Part IV concludes with the suggestion that, as private claimants become increasingly attenuated from forbears whose property was appropriated by a genocidal political regime, the public interest should progressively bear upon the resolution of claims involving works now in the collections of museums and other public trusts. distinctly Germanic architectural features. 15 Vienna's Academy of Fine Arts checked Hitler's ambitions to become a professional artist, twice rejecting his applications for admission. 16 Despiteperhaps because of-these snubs from culturally sophisticated Vienna, Hitler spent the rest of his life obsessing over establishing a colossal art museum housing Europe's greatest artworks in Linz, the provincial Austrian city in which he spent his childhood. 17 The museum's collection was to contain works appropriated by the Nazis from public and private collections throughout Europe. 18 This appropriation was part of the Nazi's wholesale confiscation from their victims, whether governments or individuals, of objects of any economic value, particularly personal property owned by Jews. 19 By the time Germany surrendered to the Allied forces in 1945, it had amassed, and secured in remote castles and mines, enormous hordes of valuables. Most significantly, these included precious metals and artworks appropriated from families and institutions throughout Europe. At the end of and following the 15 Hitler's representational style and conventional subjects are worlds apart from the styles and subjects of works that were being created by his contemporaries in cities like Berlin and Vienna, many of which the Nazis deemed "degenerate." See SHEARER WEST, THE VISUAL ARTS IN GERMANY 1890-1937: UTOPIA AND DESPAIR 181-203 (2000) (discussing the political and aesthetic notions behind Nazi suppression of modern art, and the major exhibition in which it was reviled, held in Munich in November 1937) . 16 (1994) . 19 See Sarah Gensburger, The Banality of Robbing the Jews, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2013, at SR8 ("Everything was taken: toys, dishes, family photos, tools, light bulbs."). The Bolshevik's plundering of private households in Russia approximately twenty years earlier has been similarly described:
From dressing chambers and drawing rooms, Russia's colossal collections of jewelry and precious stones now spilled out onto the streets. As Orlando Figes writes, 'the flea markets of Petrograd and Moscow were filled with the former belongings of fallen plutocrats: icons, paintings, carpets, pianos, gramophones, samovars, morning coats and ball dresses.' Family heirlooms passed down from generation to generation over centuries now passed through the hands of opportunistic strangers, heedless of their emotional value. SEAN MCMEEKIN, HISTORY'S GREATEST HEIST: THE LOOTING OF RUSSIA BY THE BOLSHEVIKS 38 (2009).
War, the "Monuments Men," a mostly American group of art historians and museum curators, located and secured these treasures. 20 In the Inter-Allied Declaration Against Acts of Dispossession Committed in Territories Under Enemy Occupation or Control, more commonly known as the "London Declaration" of 1943, the Allies agreed not to recognize wartime transfers of property in Nazi-occupied countries. 21 After the war, this rejection of the legality of documented transfers to the Nazis, which were typically forced sales or extortions, was the basis of the policies established by the Allies in 1945 to handle the vast accumulations of artworks and other valuables that the Nazis had removed to Germany during the preceding five years. 22 Because the Allies determined that Nazi-era property transfers were invalid, the enormous stores of moveable property stored in Germany were regarded as stolen assets. 23 Also in 1943, the State Department, anticipating the U.S. role in effecting the return of Nazi-confiscated moveable property, founded the Interdivisional Committee on Reparations, Restitution, and Property Rights. 24 This Committee resolved that Nazi-confiscated property in the possession of the U.S. military would be returned to the governments of the countries from which the Nazis had removed them.
25
Under this "external restitution" policy, these foreign governments, in turn, were expected to determine the lawful owners of properties within their borders, and arrange for their return. At the end of the War, each of the three Allied Zones governing post-war Europe established similar regulations by which individual states would return properties to the parties from whom the Nazis had appropriated them.
27
These regulations established periods in which claimants had to assert their petitions and judicial agencies to adjudicate them. 28 The work of the Monuments Men, and the efficacy of the Allies' policies following the War, led to the return of a great deal of artwork and other valuables to the families and institutions from which the Nazis had confiscated them. 29 However, given the massive scale of moveable property that was dislocated during the War, it is not surprising that disputes over valuable works whose ownership and possession shifted during that tumultuous period continue to arise seventy years later.
The Nazi regime kept meticulous records of its acquisitions, despite-or perhaps because of-the fact that they typically involved forced sales or outright theft.
30
This documentation has helped individuals and institutions seeking to recover artworks confiscated by the Nazis, particularly in recent years as digital archives and search tools provide universal access to information about the current location of these objects.
31
Organizations like the World Jewish Congress ("WJC") have promoted continuing restitution of artworks displaced during the Holocaust.
32
After Ronald Lauder's brief stint as President Reagan's ambassador to Austria, 33 Lauder focused on promoting 27 See id. at 2. 28 Id. at 3. 29 The U.S. museum community adopted the desiderata that this meeting established when it promulgated rigorous protocols for acquisition and handling of Holocaust-era works.
35
Political pressure from initiatives like the 1998 Washington Conference has placed museums in the awkward position of making their collections more vulnerable to external claims in order to maintain their reputations for integrity, while simultaneously safeguarding their collections as public trusts. Accordingly, museums are attractive targets for such claims not only for the obvious reason that they deal primarily with valuable works of art, but also, and paradoxically, because many of them have made significant efforts to determine and identify publicly works in their inventories whose ownership changed during the Holocaust era.
36

II. HOLOCAUST-ERA ARTWORKS: LEGISLATION & LITIGATION
A. HEAR Act of 2016
Politicians and lawyers who have advocated on behalf of private parties asserting claims to Holocaust-era works in museums have complained of museums resorting to "technical" legal defenses, specifically statutes of limitations, to forestall 34 See DORA APEL, MEMORY EFFECTS: THE HOLOCAUST AND THE ART OF SECONDARY WITNESSING 85 (2002) . 35 See Unlawful Appropriation of Objects During the Nazi Era, AMERICAN ALL. OF MUSEUMS, http://www.aam-us.org/resources/ethics-standards-and-best-practices/ collections-stewardship/objects-during-the-nazi-era (last visited on Oct. 4, 2018) (describing the protocols and ethical guidelines for acquiring and handling Holocaust-era works). 36 Listings of ongoing and resolved disputes involving such works reveal the degree to which claimants have targeted public museums. A list compiled by the law firm Herrick Feinstein LLP in 2015, indicates that of fifty-seven claims the firm has identified as having been made in the United States over the past twenty years or so, museums were the defendants in thirty-one of them. laches, (2) why it should be limited to the consequences of one specific genocide, and (3) why federal law should deal with property theft-an area typically left to the states.
43
HEAR could affect the disposition of many Holocaust-era art claims, whether lodged against museums, dealers and auction houses, or private collectors. 44 The text of the bill specifically identifies the dispositions of two disputes, both involving claims against high-profile public museums, as evidencing the need for federal legislation to preempt existing temporal limitations for such claims. 45 In both these cases, however, while the courts were cognizant of statutes of limitations, they also carefully considered the claims' factual bases, which rendered them meritless regardless of their untimeliness. Supporters of HEAR's sui generis constraints on statute of limitations defenses in Holocaust-era art disputes claim that defendants, museums in particular, who assert them to challenge the legitimacy of claims asserted decades after alleged misappropriations, are resorting to "technical defenses" that allow them to duck ethical quandaries and resolutions based "on the merits." 48 They cite the dispositions of Claudia Seger- 43 Id. The prohibition of defendants invoking laches was deleted from the text of HEAR prior to its enactment. 44 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Dunbar, a private collector from whom Seger-Thomschitz had sought to obtain the painting, and the Fifth Circuit upheld this decision.
52
The district court based its ruling upon evidence establishing that the claimant's in-laws had sold the work in a legal and voluntary sale. 53 The court noted that the Nazis had confiscated other property from the Reichels, for which the family had sought and obtained post-war restitution from the Austrian government.
54
In other words, the fact that those most knowledgeable about and directly entitled to property once owned by Oskar Reichel, claimed other works but not this Kokoschka work, indicated that they had no legal right to it.
While litigating her claim against Dunbar in Louisiana, Seger-Thomschitz brought a factually similar action against the Museum of Fine Arts (MFA) in Boston, claiming another positing that museums have behaved unethically in responding to claims to Holocaust-era artworks). 49 Kokoschka painting once owned by Reichel. 55 The MFA's exhaustive provenance research in response to the claim, which was noted by the court, established its good title to the work. 56 Only after the MFA had determined its rightful ownership did it assert that the plaintiff's claim was also barred by the Massachusetts statute of limitations. 57 Ultimately, the courts in both Dunbar and MFA dismissed Seger-Thomschitz's claims having reviewed the earlier actions of the Reichel family indicating that even if Seger-Thomschitz's claims were not timebarred, they would fail on the merits. 58 In both disputes, Seger-Thomschitz attempted to overcome state statutes of limitation that enabled the courts' efficient disposition of her claims, asserting that in the case of Holocaustera claims, such statutes were preempted by her vaguely articulated "federal common law" based on U.S. foreign policy. 59 To this proposition, the circuit court in Dunbar responded: "No court has ever adopted what Appellant is urging here-some form of special federal limitations period governing all claims involving Nazi-confiscated artwork." 60 HEAR now provides precisely such a "special federal limitations period" for such claims. 61 The following review of other recent Holocaust-era art claims considers whether they indicate a need for, or reveal the potential efficacy of, this legislation, particularly in claims involving public collections.
Bakalar & Nagy
In 2006, Milos Vavra and Leon Fischer, distant heirs of Austrian art collector Franz Grunbaum, claimed title to a drawing, "Seated Woman With a Bent Left Leg," by Egon Schiele, long owned by a good-faith purchaser David Bakalar.
62
They asserted, in federal district court in New York, that the Nazis had looted the drawing from Grunbaum's collection. 63 Therefore, the drawing was stolen property to which they were entitled as Grunbaum's heirs. 64 However, the claimants were unable to establish that the Nazis had appropriated the work from Grunbaum and, given the preponderance of evidence to the contrary, the court concluded that the Nazis had not done so. 65 The district court also took note of the extraordinarily attenuated relationships between the claimants and the pre-WWII owner of the drawing.
66
The many heirs who predeceased Vavra and Fischer were aware of Grunbaum's collection, and the dreadful circumstances of his demise.
67
None of these heirs, all of whom were much more directly related to Grunbaum than the plaintiffs, ever claimed rights to the collection or alleged the Nazis had looted it. 68 And, even if they had had a colorable claim to the collection, by not asserting it, they abandoned it long ago.
69
To allow distant heirs to make a claim-even assuming it is asserted in good faiththat rightfully should have been made by others many years earlier, would be unjust to good-faith purchasers like Bakalar, whose ownership of the work went unchallenged for half a century.
70
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment on both grounds. 63 Id. at 298. 64 See id. 65 See id. at 298-99. 66 See id. at 296 (observing that Vavra is the nephew of the daughter of the sister of Grunbaum; Fischer is the son of the daughter of the brother of the wife of Grunbaum). 67 See id. 68 See id. at 296-97. 69 See id. at 305-06. 70 Id. claim to Schiele drawings, this time in New York's Supreme Court. 72 The case is remarkable in that it involves claims to works from the same Grunbaum collection that the federal district court, several years earlier in Bakalar, determined had not been stolen by the Nazis. 73 The factual and legal issues in this new claim are essentially the same as those of the claim these plaintiffs alleged previously against Bakalar, which was adjudicated against them in federal district court, and whose verdict the Second Circuit affirmed. 74 In fact, the defendant in the new case, London art dealer Richard Nagy, deliberately delayed purchasing the claimed works until after the district and appellate courts in Bakalar had established that the collection containing these works had not been looted, and that there was no basis for Fischer and Vavra's claim to them. 75 Fischer and Vavra brought their second claim in New York state court, hoping that this alternate forum might ignore or counter federal court precedent dealing with their earlier allegation with the same factual circumstances. 76 They referenced HEAR, claiming that this recently enacted federal legislation precludes Nagy's laches defense. In 2011 Bakalar successfully asserted the same defense-that the plaintiffs' forbears were well aware of Grunbaum's collection and did not pursue ownership of it-to establish rightful ownership of his Schiele drawing from the same collection. 77 Fischer and Vavra undoubtedly realized that the prohibition of laches defenses in the initial draft of HEAR was challenged during the Senate committee hearing on the legislation and struck from the text of the bill that was passed into law.
78
HEAR does not offer plaintiffs any new or stronger legal bases for their claims; Fischer and Vavra's invocation of this legislation is simply an attempt to influence the court's handling of the dispute with recent evidence of Congress's sympathy towards Holocaustera claimants.
Ullin & Von Saher a. Ullin v. Detroit Institute of Arts
The claimant in Ullin sought to obtain from the Detroit Institute of Arts ("DIA") a Van Gogh painting that his mother had sold in Switzerland, in 1938 to Jewish refugee art dealers with whom she was acquainted.
79
Just as the DIA had concluded earlier in its investigation of the painting's provenance, the district court determined that this sale had been voluntary and legal, and that the plaintiff's claim had no legal footing.
80
Ullin hoped to capitalize upon the impertinent fact that his mother had sold the painting after she left Nazi Germany in an effort to taint the legality and ethicality of the sale by which the DIA ultimately acquired the painting as a donation from a good-faith purchaser.
81
Having expended resources to investigate Ullin's claim and having determined it was unfounded, the DIA naturally sought to dispose of the case as expeditiously and economically as 78 To this end, it asserted that the claim was barred by the three-year state statute of limitations for conversion actions. 83 The court agreed with the museum and dismissed the claim "with prejudice," prohibiting the plaintiff from litigating the claim further and signaling its opinion that the claim was baseless on its merits. 84 HEAR does not permit Claude Ullin to reopen his claim because he identified the location of the painting in question after 1998, and more than six years have passed since the district court ruled in favor of the DIA in 2007. 85 HEAR pointedly also identifies, however, the disposition of Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art as evidencing the need for a federal statute exempting claims to Holocaust-era artworks from temporal defenses.
86
The Von Saher litigation has involved temporal defenses, but also brings into focus ethical issues associated with claims asserted by attenuated private parties for works in public museums. 87 Accordingly, it is worth examining this dispute at some length.
b. Marei von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art i. Cranach's Adam and Eve
Lucas Cranach the Elder (1472-1553), known among his contemporaries as "swiftest painter" (pictor celerrimus), produced over fifty paintings on the subject of the Temptation of Man.
88
He painted the works now owned by the Norton Simon 103 See, e.g., the 1939 film Ninotchka, in which a humorless Soviet agent played by Greta Garbo is sent to Paris to retrieve jewels that had been seized from citizens during the Russian Revolution after Soviet delegates abandon the plan to sell them. NINOTCHKA, (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939).
had been confiscated by the Bolsheviks.
104
Under this agreement, Germany recognized the Soviet state in order to sell its goodsparticularly military and industrial equipment-to the Soviet Union. Germany thereby enabled the near-bankrupt Soviets to pay for such material from the proceeds of sales to westerners, transacted in Germany, of properties that the Soviet state had confiscated from its own citizens.
105
The
107
He may have believed that the paintings had been confiscated from the Stroganoff family rather than the Ukrainian Church because the Soviets had included the paintings in the inventory of an auction identified as "The Stroganoff Collection." 
117
Göring paid the Goudstikker firm two million guilders for the works he appropriated from itapproximately the same total amount Jacques Goudstikker had paid over time to acquire the same works. 118 After the U.S. military impounded Göring's collection in the aftermath of WWII, in accordance with the U.S. policy of external restitution, the Cranachs were entrusted to the Dutch government, which assumed responsibility for ultimate distribution of such property.
119
Goudstikker had died in an accident on the ship on which he left the Netherlands, and his wife, along with other family members with financial interest in Goudstikker's inventory, resolved not to submit a claim to the Dutch government for the paintings acquired by Göring.
120
They did not submit a claim because obtaining the paintings would result in the government annulling the forced sale that Göring had imposed on the Goudstikker firm to acquire the works.
121
The family did not want this voidance because it would entail forfeit of Göring's two million guilders, or what remained of that payment, to obtain the inventory of an art dealership that Goudstikker's heirs did not want to revive.
122
By electing not to file a claim to recover the firm's erstwhile inventory in favor of retaining the monies Göring had paid for it, the Goudstikkers transferred ownership of the inventory to the Dutch government.
123
The government then sold many of the works and placed others, including the Cranachs, in various national museums.
124
In 1961, George Stroganoff, descendant of the exiled Russian family, claimed four paintings he asserted the Bolsheviks had confiscated from his ancestors, and which were among those returned by the Allied forces to the Dutch government at the end of WWII.
125
Among the four works, were the Cranachs that Goudstikker had acquired at Lepke's "Stroganoff Collection" auction in Berlin thirty years earlier.
126
While the Dutch government asserted good title to the paintings, it may have recognized the injustice of the Bolsheviks' seizure of the Stroganoff's property. For, in 1966, the Dutch government negotiated a settlement under which George Stroganoff abandoned another claim for a Rembrandt painting, 119 Id. at 7. 120 Id. at 6, 12. 121 Id. at 13, 14. 122 Id. 
129
Von Saher, née Langenbein, a figure skater from Germany, had married Jacques Goudstikker's son Eduard who, in turn, had assumed his stepfather's surname. 130 Eduard died prematurely in 1996 and Marei was his sole heir. 131 The Goudstikkers had effectively conveyed to the Dutch government title to works they had elected not to claim in order to retain instead the funds Göring had paid for them. 132 Nevertheless, in the late 1990's Marei von Saher attempted to obtain these works, or their monetary value, by appealing to the Dutch courts, which summarily rejected her claims as legally deficient. (providing an exhaustive account of the Goudstikker firm's deliberate strategy, based on financial interest, to seek "selective restitution" of property it was forced to sell, by which the Dutch government became owner of the Cranachs). 133 See id. at 23.
In response to political pressure from the United States, specifically, promulgation of the Washington Principles of 1998, the Dutch government established a Restitution Committee that recommended less legally oriented consideration of Holocaust-era claims. 134 In the spirit of this policy, and despite its position that it held good title to the works, in 2006, the Dutch government gave Von Saher around 200 paintings from national collections, which had once been within Goudstikker's inventory. 135 Since this accommodation by the Dutch government in 2006, Von Saher has embarked on a spree of claims, seeking to obtain from European and American museums and private collectors as many of the works once in Goudstikker's stock that she can locate. 136 Using proceeds from sales of works she has successfully procured from the Dutch government and others, she has funded a prosecutorial enterprise involving lawyers and detectives. 137 
v. Von Saher's Claim Against the Norton Simon Museum
In 2007, when Marei von Saher brought her initial claim against the Norton Simon Museum in federal district court in Los Angeles, the court did not evaluate her assertion of ownership of the Cranachs because it determined that she had based her case upon an unconstitutional California statute. 138 In 2002, prior to filing her claim, Von Saher's lawyers, realizing that the claim was long barred by the California statute of limitations, successfully lobbied the California legislature, through the temporarily established "Jewish Community Relations Committee," to enact tailored legislation to accommodate Von Saher's claim. 139 The statute privileged claims against museums, based on assertions by the original owners or their heirs or beneficiaries, that the claimed artworks had been misappropriated during the Holocaust. 140 Under this sui generis legislation, until 2010, these claims were to be exempt from California's statute of limitations governing similar claims not involving Holocaust-era artifacts.
141
The district court determined that this exemption for disputes involving Holocaust-era artworks was an unconstitutional intrusion by the California legislature on the federal government's exclusive authority over U.S. foreign policy. 142 In other words, the statute, enacted at Von Saher's behest, constituted ex-post-facto meddling by the California legislature in policies and procedures that had been agreed upon between the United States and the Netherlands at the end of WWII regarding the disposition of art works returned to the Netherlands by Allied forces. 143 When Von Saher appealed the district court's dismissal of her claim, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the lower court's determination that the statutory basis of her claim was unconstitutional. 144 Nevertheless, it granted Von Saher the opportunity to reassert her claim if she believed she could demonstrate that she had asserted it within the three-year period of California's statute of limitations for the recovery of personal property. 145 Immediately following the appellate court's decision, Von Saher's lawyers again lobbied the California legislature to carve out an exception to the statute of limitations for actions to recover stolen property, which might accommodate her claim. 146 And in 2010, the legislature amended the statute, doubling the period in which claimants could lodge claims against museums for specific artworks that may have been misappropriated within the past century. 147 Von Saher also appealed the 2009 affirmation of the Ninth Circuit that the California Holocaust claims statute was unconstitutional, to the United States Supreme Court.
148
The Supreme Court in turn solicited the opinions of the U.S. Departments of State and Justice on this question. 149 In their amicus brief, these departments repudiated the California legislature's intrusion on the foreign affairs prerogatives of the U.S. government through the statutory amendment enacted on Von Saher's behalf, and recommended the Supreme Court not entertain Von Saher's appeal. 150 Despite this disapproval by the U.S. government, in 2011, Von Saher reasserted her claim in district court, which again dismissed her claim outright. 151 Regardless of the claim's colorable viability under the revised California statute of limitations, the court observed incredulously that Von Saher "disputes that the Solicitor General has accurately expressed United States foreign policy, and asks the Court to supplant the Solicitor General's statement of current United States foreign policy with her own." 152 When Von Saher appealed this dismissal in 2014, Ninth Circuit Judge Dorothy Nelson justified her overturning of the lower court's decision with the equivalent of a similar effort "to supplant the Solicitor General's statement of current United States foreign policy with her own." 153 The majority's opinion is rife with prejudice and dubious factual conclusions. It discusses at length Göring's confiscation of the Cranachs through a forced sale, but never mentions the Bolsheviks' looting that led to Goudstikker's questionable acquisition of them. 
155
It opines that the paintings may not have been subject to bona fide post-war restitution proceedings in the Netherlands despite the fact that both the U.S. and the Dutch governments have established unequivocally that they were. 156 The majority found that Von Saher's claim does not conflict with U.S. foreign policy because it is a dispute between private parties. In other words, if the sale of the Cranachs to Stroganoff constitutes an official act of the Dutch government, U.S. courts must respect it, particularly if failing to do so might conflict with U.S. diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.
159
The Ninth Circuit then remanded the case to the district court to investigate the applicability of this doctrine to the dispute. 160 In 2016, the district court granted Norton Simon's motion for summary judgment and established the museum's good title to the Cranachs. 161 Rather than exploring the potential applicability of the act of state doctrine to this dispute, as the Ninth Circuit had advised, the court addressed the more fundamental question as to whether the Dutch State had ever owned the Cranachs. 162 Both parties agreed that if the Dutch State had once owned these works then Norton Simon would now have good title to them. 163 Accordingly, the dispute could be settled by answering that question. 155 Id. at 718. 156 Id. Unsurprisingly, Nelson's opinion, subscribed to by her similarly seasoned colleague Judge Harry Pregerson (age 92), provoked a dissenting opinion from the third member of the panel, Judge Kim Wardlaw. In Wardlaw's dissent, the majority's position constitutes an unauthorized and deleterious countering of the Executive's pronouncement of U.S. foreign policy that was specifically expressed in connection with Von Saher's claim. See id. at 727-29 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting).
The court based its affirmative answer to this question by considering various royal decrees promulgated by the exiled Dutch government during WWII. 164 These laws, the court found, unequivocally establish that during the restitution period following the war, the Dutch government became the owner of the Cranachs, and not merely a custodian as Von Saher claimed. 165 Von Saher immediately appealed this determination to the Ninth Circuit, claiming the district court had incorrectly interpreted Dutch law. 166 In July 2018 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, determining that the Dutch Government's post-war disposition of the Cranachs, and specifically its transfer of their ownership to Stroganoff, was an act of state. 167 The court observed that under the Act of State Doctrine, U.S. courts must recognize acts of state by foreign governments unless they violate principles of international law. 168 The Dutch Government's transfer of ownership to the Cranachs was an official and legitimate state transaction. 169 Moreover, unlike commercial transactions effected among private citizens, the transfer of state property clearly implicated Dutch polity. 164 Id. at *10. 165 See id. at *14. The district court's extensive discussion of the question of the Dutch government's ownership relies heavily on the defendants' motion for summary judgment-a tour de force that handily dissects the extraordinary tangle of applicable Dutch and U.S. law and policy in this case. 166 In light of the court's exhaustive analysis of the facts and law involved in this dispute, and Judge Wardlaw's trenchant concurrence as to the claim's lack of merit, Von Saher's subsequent petition for an en banc rehearing by the Ninth Circuit appears almost truculent. Unsurprisingly, the court denied her petition. 172 Von Saher plans to appeal the Ninth Circuit's decision to the Supreme Court, which mandates a three-month period from the date of the decision in which to file a petition for a Writ of Certiorari. 173 Von Saher, a seasoned and well-heeled litigant, was undoubtedly aware of the probability of the Ninth Circuit's ruling, and could have filed her petition to the Supreme Court within the prescribed period. Instead she applied directly to Justice Elena Kagan (Ninth Circuit Justice) seeking an extension of an additional three months in which to file, which Justice Kagan granted. 174 Most of Von Saher's Application to Justice Kagan is devoted to arguments about the merits of her claim, followed by dubious justifications for the extension, like her attorneys' busy schedules, the feast of Chanukah and, most hubristic, the likelihood that the Supreme Court would grant her petition for Certiorari. 175 Accordingly, Von Saher's Application based upon a purported need for an extension, appears more likely to be an attempt to lay a foundation within the court, of a consensus in favor of granting her petition, by targeting the attention of a Justice she hopes may be sympathetic to her claim.
vi. The HEAR Act and Von Saher's Claim Against the Norton Simon Museum HEAR cites Von Saher's claim to support its premise that disputes involving Holocaust-era artworks should be exempt from temporal defenses. 176 The timeliness of Von Saher's claim, however, had no bearing on the district court's recent decision in favor of the Norton Simon Museum. As in the earlier Ullin and Seger-Thomschitz disputes, the district court found that even if Von Saher's claim had been timely, it was meritless based on the facts of the case.
177
In 2009, when the Ninth Circuit ruled against Von Saher because California's law exempting Holocaust claims from statutory time limits was unconstitutional, the court observed: "California's real purpose was to create a friendly forum for litigating Holocaust restitution claims, open to anyone in the world to sue a museum or gallery." 178 The apparent objective of HEAR is to create a similarly friendly forum, but on a national scale, which would privilege claimants for Holocaust-era artworks by providing them an exceptional period in which to assert claims.
HEAR enables claimants to overcome both challenges that their claims are untimely, and also that they are based on state law that impermissibly intrudes on the federal government's exclusive authority over foreign policy. 179 In other words, by enabling previously barred claims against foreign states and individuals, HEAR becomes de facto U.S. foreign policy, regardless of potential conflicts with the Executive, and the State Department in particular.
180
Given that HEAR's purpose is to disallow the use of statutes of limitations as the means to dismiss cases, it is worth considering the salutatory objectives of such defenses, and whether these may be met even when applied in Holocaust-era artwork claims.
181
As the time between an injustice and claims for reparation based on that injustice increases, society grows less sympathetic to the interests of claimants. This ebbing is reflected in statutes of limitation that promote timely resolution of claims when facts relating to the injustice are freshest. With the passage of time 177 Von Saher, 2016 WL 7626153, at *8. 178 Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 578 F.3d 1016, 1026 (9th Cir. 2009). 179 See Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act § 5(a). 180 HEAR is not limited to claims against U.S. defendants. This is troublesome from a foreign policy perspective in its potential to affect the disposition of claims involving works owned by foreign governments, like those of European state collections.
181 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act § 2(6).
both defendants and also claimants become increasingly attenuated from the parties responsible for the injustice, and the victims of it, respectively. For example, claims for financial reparations to African Americans living today, based on the enslavement of ancestors endured in the South until the Civil War, have gained little traction.
182
Americans who instigated and benefited from the injustice of slavery, southern landowners in particular, are long dead and, like the Nazis eighty years later, were defeated in war. Owners of any remaining properties whose economic enhancement can be legitimately traced to enslaved labor are only distantly, or un-related to perpetrators of the earlier injustice.
Wresting assets from descendants and innocent purchasers 150 years after their wrongful acquisition is akin to holding children responsible for the crimes of their parents, or further-removed ancestors. American society is, therefore, more comfortable with attempts to rectify the lingering injustices of slavery with efforts like affirmative action in education that, at least theoretically, benefit an entire class of people whose ancestors suffered a profound injustice.
Likewise, statutes of limitation applied to property disputes reflect a collective belief that the right of a good-faith purchaser to hold title to legitimately acquired property outweighs the right of a claimant to assert at any time a legal interest in that property.
183
They are not arbitrary or procrustean "technical" defenses that promote unethical outcomes by enabling defendants to thwart claimants from litigating justifiable claims of alleged civil wrongs. 184 Rather, statutes of limitation for property claims promote fairness, and are intended to curb unjust outcomes that turn on documentation and memories that 182 Georgetown University, along with a number of well-established U.S. universities that once benefited financially from slavery, recently took steps to atone for this past, by offering a preferential admission policy-not financial awards-to identifiable descendants of slaves whose lives they once capitalized on. See have become increasingly stale and sketchy, as well as chains of title that have become progressively convoluted with the passage of time. 185 HEAR, however, turns this objective on its head, insofar as it is premised on the fact that because the Holocaust occurred long ago, claims in U.S. courts for Nazi-appropriated art should be exempt from statutes of limitation.
186
HEAR's sui generis limitations period tolls only when a claimant had actual knowledge of the current location of a work, and not at the point when a claimant might reasonably be expected to act on information made available to him. 187 In her discussion of the potential use of temporal defenses in Holocaust-era art claims, and the equitable defense of laches particularly, Alexandra Minkovich has argued that good-faith purchasers who assert this defense "are innocent parties who risk losing possession of a work for which they gave valuable consideration and to which they believed they had valid title." 188 Paradoxically, Minkovich notes that the growing resources of information about the theft and movement of artworks during the Holocaust, should make laches defenses more viable as dilatory plaintiffs may more readily be perceived as having "slept on their rights." 189 Minkovich also observes that: "[c]ourts may find the policy of returning property stolen by the Nazis to its original owners less compelling when the plaintiff is several generations removed from the original owner, never knew the original owner, and has no connection with the stolen property." 190 185 See id. 186 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act § 2(6) ("Those seeking recovery of Nazi-confiscated art must painstakingly piece together their cases from a fragmentary historical record . . . ."). On the other hand, Allen Gerson a former State Department official, has claimed that Russia is deliberately attempting to capitalize on the fact that claims weaken over time by suppressing information about its vast caches of Nazi-looted art that were shipped from Germany to Russia at the end of WWII. HEAR is also problematic in that it was motivated by judicial dispositions of claims for restitution of art works that are now owned by public institutions.
191
Given the complexity of many claims hitherto against museums, for artworks displaced, transferred, or stolen during the Holocaust, it is worth considering whether HEAR will likely promote more equitable and socially desirable dispositions of such disputes.
III. PUBLIC INTEREST, PUBLIC MUSEUMS, AND
HOLOCAUST-ERA CLAIMS
A. Museums as Targets of Holocaust-era Restitution Claims
Most of the claims asserted in the United States relating to artwork displaced during WWII have been against public museums or other non-profit organizations, and the U.S. or state governments.
192
Museums are attractive targets for such claims for the obvious reason that they deal primarily with works of art. Ironically, they are also attractive targets because many have made significant efforts responding to initiatives like the Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, to identify publicly all works in their inventories that changed ownership during WWII.
193
Public museums are not only "where the art is" but also, ultimately from the claimants' perspective, "where the money is." Claimants routinely profess that their claims are motivated by a desire to seek justice for persecuted relatives-commonly long deceased-or by sentimental attachment to works of art with 191 194 However, many, if not most of the works that have been turned over by museums and governments to these claimants have been subsequently sold to the highest bidder, and the works disappear from museum collections into the hands of private collectors.
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Most likely, some then migrate to storage vaults in Switzerland or the Cayman Islands where they are seen by no one, like precious metals stored in darkness by owners anticipating appreciation over time.
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In some cases, museums have simply paid successful claimants the estimated market value of a work to retain ownership of it. 197 This is a desirable approach in so far as it reduces transaction costs and leaves the work in the public sphere. Unwarranted "buy backs," however, siphon resources from, and thereby debilitate, public museums, particularly those with relatively modest financial reserves whose primary assets are works of art often acquired by bequest.
This was the case, for instance, in the disposition of the claim to a well-known portrait by Egon Schiele owned by Austria's Leopold Museum. In 2010, a decade after District Attorney Robert Morgenthau's widely disapproved seizure of the portrait while the Leopold was lending it to New York's Museum of Modern Art, 198 the Leopold paid $19 million to the heirs of an 194 See, e.g., SIMON GOODMAN, THE ORPHEUS CLOCK: THE SEARCH FOR MY FAMILY'S ART TREASURES STOLEN BY THE NAZIS 317 (2015) (discussing his acquisition of valuable artworks, including works in public museums-most which he then sold-once owned by his grandfather, in connection with his status as a particular child designated "as a 'memorial candle': one who took on the mission of preserving the past and connecting to the future"). 195 early owner of the work. 199 To cover this payment, whether restitution or ransom, as well as over $4 million of legal fees, the museum was compelled to de-accession other works in its collection. 200 B. Holocaust-era Artwork Claims and the Perception of a "Holocaust Industry"
In his controversial book, The Holocaust Industry, Norman Finkelstein claims that a cadre of lawyers, politicians, and leaders of several Jewish organizations have coopted the Holocaust and used it as a cudgel to extort assets from Switzerland, Germany, and Austria. 201 According to Finkelstein, negligible portions of the assets they obtained have benefited Holocaust survivors. 202 Most ended up in the hands of a few prominent Jewish organizations, and extravagantly compensated lawyers. 203 Only a minute segment of the European Jewish population that was decimated during the Holocaust owned Swiss bank accounts, life insurance policies, and works by Klimt and Schiele. 204 During WWII, wealthy Jewish families tended to fare better than middle class and poor families who lacked the assets and influence that made it easier to escape the worst Nazi persecution. 205 Unsurprisingly, offspring of these families of ordinary means are disconcerted by claimants who have garnered enormous financial windfalls in part by invoking the genocide of millions of Jews, most of the descendants of whom obtained nothing. 206 
C. Museums and Public Interest
Works of art are among the least fungible forms of moveable property. Artworks' uniqueness generates greater emotional bonds between them and their individual or collective owners than those that exist between owners and fungible assets like cash or insurance policies.
When an artwork enters the collection of a public museum, its prestige and financial worth increase because the public values not only the work itself, but also the museum's imprimatur of connoisseurship. Because the public generates value, it also, over time, develops an affinity with the work and thereby acquires interest akin to ownership of it. 207 This is why museums' attempts to de-accession works to generate funds, even to survive, are typically met with vociferous opposition. 208 The import of the public's contribution to the prestige of cultural artifacts was implicated in the outcome of Maria Altmann's recent claim against Austria for five Klimt paintings. Altmann's aunt Adele, the original owner, and subject of the most famous of the five works, unequivocally wished the paintings to be ultimately, and permanently, displayed for the public's enjoyment in the State Museum in Vienna. 209 If Altmann had prosecuted her claim-the subject of a fanciful recounting in a recent feature film produced by Harvey Weinstein 210 -against a private collector or dealer who kept these works out of public sight, we would be less perturbed by the outcome of the dispute in which Altmann sought the greatest possible monetary profit by selling all five paintings to private parties.
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This outcome was lamentable, however, because the works were taken from a museum whose location and admiring public had, over decades, generated much of the paintings' significance and economic value.
212
When Altmann sold the paintings, a handful of distant heirs, private buyers, and lawyers arrogated and liquidated this public investment and appreciation. 213 Today, of the five Klimts, only the painting purchased by Ronald Lauder is in the permanent collection of a museum open to the public, the Neue Galerie in New York. 214 Museums have been extraordinarily accommodating of claims to Holocaust-era works in their collections.
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Descendants of Holocaust victims have lodged most of these claims, although the governments of Italy and Poland have asserted claims as well.
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For instance, in 2010, Italy claimed a Renaissance-era work, then in Boston's Museum of Fine Arts ("MFA"), had been looted during WWII from the premises of a 211 See Kimmelman, supra note 195, at E1 (noting that by briefly lending the paintings to the Los Angeles County Museum of Art and Ronald Lauder's Neue Galerie, Altmann garnered "presale publicity of a sort that no auction house could organize"). In other words, after obtaining the five paintings from Vienna's Belvedere Museum, Altmann also capitalized on the imprimatur and repute of public museums in the United States to boost the prestige and, ultimately, sale prices of the works. Ronald Lauder participated in this strategic plan when he paid $135 million-the highest sum ever paid for a painting-for Portrait of Adele, thereby priming the pump for the later sale at auction of the remaining four pictures. See Carol Vogel, Lauder Pays $135 Million, a Record, for a Klimt Portrait, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2006, at E7. 212 See Kimmelman, supra note 195, at E1. 213 Such investment and ownership is akin to what Herbert Lazarow identifies as the "endowment effect" underlying statutes of limitations: "It has been observed that people will demand more to sell property that they own than they will pay to acquire the same property. [That] [a]ttachment to property grows as the period of possession lengthens." Lazerow, supra note 40, at 225 . 214 See About the Collection, NEUE GALERIE, https://www.neuegalerie.org/ collection/about-the-collection. Unlike similarly specialized collections, which are typically public charities governed by boards of trustees, the Neue Galerie is a private foundation that Ronald Lauder established and controls. Id.
215 See Frankel & Forrest, supra note 14, at 329-35 (listing thirty-two claims since 1998 in which museums either relinquished the claimed works to the claimants, or kept them after negotiating financial settlements with the claimants). 216 See id. at 329-34.
small museum in Trento.
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After investigating the claim, the MFA-which acquired the work in good faith in 1946 from an Italian dealer no less-returned it to the Trento museum. 218 Legitimate institutional claims that result in a museum's forfeit of a disputed work-like that involving the Boston and Trento museums-raise fewer ethical misgivings than do claims against museums made by private parties like Marei von Saher and Maria Altmann. This is true because when a work is transferred between two public institutions, the cultural and economic value generated by the public is not lost, or usurped by a private party. This is true also because the more attenuated the relationship between private complainants and original owners of purportedly stolen works, the less sympathetic we are to their claims, particularly those lodged against public resources.
219
With public/institutional claimants, on the other hand, the passage of time does not necessarily diminish public sympathy for the claims, and might even augment it. 220 Let us suppose that privately owned real property confiscated by the Nazis in the 1930s was acquired in good faith in the 1970s. The good-faith buyer subsequently donates the property to establish a public park. His gift has positively affected the lives of thousands over the past forty years-a positive outcome from the wake of a terrible era. Imagine too, that a well-heeled heir of the family whose property had been confiscated asserts a claim to it, or its cash value, decades after the property has been used to effect a public good. Regardless of the legal basis of the claim, it is ethically fraught if capitulating to the claim would debilitate or eradicate a public resource that has enhanced the lives of many, to benefit an individual with a tenuous association with the resource. Therefore, the identity of the defendant in a restitution claim influences our perception of its legitimacy. Claimants against museums, however, may regard such institutional defendants along the lines of storehouses of fungible properties, like banks, rather than stewards of unique artworks held in public trusts. For instance, Eric Simon, who is hostile to the interests of the museum founded by his grandfather, has suggested in connection with Von Saher's claim: "The choice should be an easy one: replace the two paintings on the wall of the museum with two of many works of art kept indefinitely in storage, or be singled out as an apologist for Nazi art theft." 221 This suggestion reflects an insidious notion that art museums should readily capitulate to restitution claims simply to avoid negative publicity, or even scandalous insinuations of anti-Semitism within their managerial ranks. 222 One commentator has noted how this threat has affected museums' handling of restitution claims:
When the [provenance] record is less clear, museums often return a claimed work, even if they do not fully believe that the claimant is entitled to it. Thus, a critic of one of the most wellknown restitution specialists, Clemens Toussaint, has said that "[h]is restitution tactics are almost like blackmail because museums are so afraid of the bad publicity, they feel they have no choice." 223 In most cases, museums have negotiated directly with claimants, partly to avert negative publicity, even if baseless, that invariably attaches to simply being named a defendant in such a lawsuit. 224 And these settlements have typically resulted in the museum giving the work, or its cash value, to the claimant. 225 
CONCLUSION
In Francofonia, Alexander Sokurov's phantasmagorical contemplation on the migration of cultural works, the film director laconically observes that significant works of art are destined to migrate and settle where war brings them. 226 Many recent efforts that attempt to reverse the consequences of this ineluctable movement, including claims by attenuated heirs for works looted by Nazis that are now in public museums, imply philosopher Max Weber's "theodicy of disprivilege." 227 As Michael Roth explains in his review of David Rieff's recent In Praise of Forgetting, this is [T] he belief that salvation comes to those who've suffered most. Who has endured more, Jews or Palestinians? Or is it AfricanAmericans? The sordid competition among groups for beatitude through traumatization has become a fact of American cultural life. 228 Only those who directly suffered at the hands of the Nazis may comprehend the pain and loss inflicted on Jews and other minorities during the Holocaust.
But this is true of the consequences of any genocidal or monstrously unjust political regime. Accordingly, the more attenuated the relationship between those who actually suffered persecution, and downstream claimants of their confiscated property, the more likely such claims appear to have questionable grounds. They may be perceived to be motivated less from the preservation of memory as a "nourishing connectivity," and more as a means to financial windfalls and, in Roth's words, "the perpetuation of resentment and the desire for revenge." 229 Accordingly, perhaps the most problematic aspect of HEAR, and hortatory proclamations like the Washington Conference Principles on Confiscated Art and the Terezin Declaration, lies in their according heirs the same moral and legal standing as direct victims of Nazi persecution and predation. 230 Because most of these victims who survived the Holocaust are now deceased, the end result of initiatives like HEAR may be to benefit a few claimants-and their contingency-fee lawyers-who neither directly suffered at the hands of the Nazis, nor worked to acquire the artworks the Nazis looted from their forbears.
Legislative carve-outs like HEAR privilege a narrow segment of a particular class of living descendants from victims of a particular appalling injustice. But a vast number of living individuals are ultimately descended from ancestors persecuted and robbed during one or another violent and unjust regime, e.g.: Great Britain's genocide of over two million Irish in the 1840s; 231 Stalin's extermination of millions of Russians and Ukrainians in the 1930s; 232 Hirohito's massacre of millions of Chinese and Koreans during WWII; 233 Castro's violation of human and private property rights in the early 1960s. 234 While descendants of other once-victimized populations may pursue legislative preferential treatment like HEAR, such efforts that enable so few to benefit so handsomely risk tarnishing the collective remembrance of barbarities that affected millions.
HEAR asserts that its prohibition of time-based defenses for Holocaust-era art claims is necessary because it is only now, seventy-five years after the Holocaust, that some claimants have located works or information indicating that an ancestor who was persecuted during the Holocaust may have once owned an object. 235 But it is also true that the passage of time has rendered claimants more attenuated from the actual victims. Moreover, many works that have been claimed have surfaced in museums that acquired them legally, and have made them available to the public long after the deaths of those who owned them before the Holocaust.
Our perception of the ethicality of an art restitution claim, therefore, depends in part on attributes of both the claimant and the defendant. Accordingly, we would almost certainly be sympathetic to claims by actual victims of the Nazis against dealers who knowingly trafficked in, and profited from, artworks stolen from them. Likewise, the positive perception of museums' recoveries of works privately owned-like the National Museum of Warsaw's recovery of the Geldorp portrait purchased in good faith by a private party-is enhanced by the ensuing public benefit.
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By the same token, we are less sympathetic to claims lodged by second or third-generation descendants against public museums that acquired in good faith once-confiscated works that have already been subject to legitimate restitution proceedings.
Exemptions from temporal defenses may be reasonable insofar as they may allow claimaints to hold accountable dealerships and auction houses that knowingly capitalized upon the poisoned fruits of Nazi injustice. Museums that are public charities, however, which believe they have good title to a claimed work, should not be prevented from using temporal defenses to avoid devolutions to jury trials and inappurtenant campaigns to influence public opinion.
